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ABSTRACT
The future is unlike the past. This is an absolutely basic observation, as basic as the
observation that “things fall”. We expect that a real understanding of the Arrow of
Time — the temporal “direction” defined by the physical differences between the future
and the past — will arise only in the context of some deep theory, such as string theory.
Conversely, we argue here that such an understanding is urgently required if recent string-
theoretic ideas about cosmology are to be made to function.
In this work, we explain in detail why it is so difficult to find a satisfactory theory
of the Arrow of Time. There are several difficulties, but the key problems arise from
Roger Penrose’s observation that the Arrow is ultimately connected with the extremely
“non-generic” character of the spatial geometry of the earliest Universe. We argue that
the explanations of the Arrow proposed hitherto are unsatisfactory, because they do not
address this basic point. In any case, none of them applies to the string Landscape, in
which the nucleation of baby universes is postulated to “populate” the multiverse. Here
we argue that baby universes can only have an Arrow if they inherit one; the problem of
explaining the Arrow is thus reduced to explaining it in the case of the original universe.
Motivated by a recent formulation of “creation from nothing” in the context of string
theory, we propose that the original universe was created along a spacelike surface with
the topology of a torus. Using deep results in global differential geometry, we are able to
show that the geometry of this surface had to be non-generic. This geometric “specialness”
is communicated to matter through the inflaton, the basic physical field postulated by the
theory of Inflation. Thus we have a theory of the Arrow which is intrinsically geometric,
which incorporates Inflation, and which allows universes in the Landscape to begin with
physically acceptable initial conditions.
1. 10500 — You Call That “Large”?
As is well known — some would say “notorious” — string theory admits a “very large”
number of internally consistent basic models of the Universe: this is the string Landscape
[1][2][3]. The number usually cited, simply for definiteness, is 10500. Here we shall argue
that this number is not at all “large”: it is in fact perilously small.
Leaving this claim to one side for the moment, having a “large” number like 10500
emerge naturally from a physical theory is of the utmost interest. For Nature herself
has recently seen fit to present us with an exceedingly small number. Since 1998 [4][5],
evidence has been mounting that an invisible negative-pressure energy component is cur-
rently dominating the evolution of our Universe. The evidence for this “dark energy” is
strictly gravitational in nature, so, in stating its properties, we use units appropriate to
gravitation. These are the Planck Units. An example of such units is the Planck density,
given in terms of ordinary units by 5.15500×1096 kilogrammes per cubic metre. The dark
energy mass density is given in these units by
ρDE ≈ 10− 120. (1)
The first point to note with regard to this number is that all attempts to compute a
unique value for it, or for the related quantity known as the cosmological constant, have
failed. In string theory, one has a likely candidate, the vacuum energy density, but the
theory does not fix this quantity uniquely : it varies across the Landscape. The second
point to note is that this number does appear to be very small indeed; but perhaps it is
not so small when we discover that we may have something like 10500 opportunities to
realise it. This may possibly be the case if we identify the observed dark energy with the
Landscape vacuum energy.
The situation is analogous to the following one. Suppose that you have made it
your life’s goal to throw a dart at a dartboard in such a manner that the dart strikes
the “bullseye”. There are various ways in which this ambition might be realised. You
might cheat, using perhaps a system of powerful concealed magnets to ensure the desired
outcome. A marginally less ignominious scheme would be to throw handfuls of darts at
the board, without bothering to aim; with a few thousand darts, a bullseye will probably
be scored; the superfluous darts can then be removed.
Now suppose that a game official enters the room and finds a single dart in the bullseye.
The question as to which of our suggested techniques has actually been used can only
be settled by examining the circumstances. If, for example, a scrupulous search fails to
reveal any magnetic devices, but does uncover a crate containing several thousand darts,
then it is reasonable to assume that the second method has been employed.
Our failure to find a means of uniquely deriving a very tiny cosmological constant from
first principles, combined with the existence of a huge number of string vacua, inclines
many to favour an account of the situation analogous to the second method of dart-
playing. That is, given a “large” number of possible vacua with suitably spaced vacuum
energies, one can hope to show that at least one string vacuum with the observed energy
will be internally consistent. (It should be said that actually making this proposal work
at a technical level is — contrary to a widespread misapprehension — an extremely
non-trivial and delicate matter: see [3].)
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Now the reader is asked to note the care with which we have chosen our words: we
say that the vacuum is internally consistent, not that it exists1. There is a very clear
moral distinction between conspiring to cheat as a way of winning a professional darts
game, and actually carrying out such a conspiracy. More than this: if one actually tries
to score a bullseye by throwing thousands of darts at the board, one needs to explain in
detail exactly how one proposes to secure such a large supply of darts.
Similarly, we need a way of actually building the universe whose internal consistency we
have asserted. The simplest approach is to find some mechanism that automatically builds
essentially every universe in the Landscape. This automatically brings into existence
universes with the “right” value of the vacuum energy.
The currently favoured mechanism for building universes is the nucleation of “baby
universes,” which split off from a given universe under rather general conditions. Baby
universes can have properties which differ radically from those of their parents. There
are grounds for believing that this variability allows essentially all of the Landscape to
be brought into actual existence, with baby universes having suitably spaced vacuum
energies, as above [3]. The idea is that baby universes can themselves eventually have
babies; thus, even if a particular universe in the Landscape does not have a particularly
small vacuum energy, one or more of its descendants may well have a cosmological constant
similar in value to the one we observe.
It seems to be generally assumed that, having found a mechanism for producing the
right value of the vacuum energy, our task of universe-building is essentially complete; for
even after discarding babies with the “wrong” vacuum energy, one still finds an enormous
number of babies which do resemble our Universe in that respect. Surely a universe just
like ours can be found in this huge ensemble? Let us examine this assumption more
closely, however.
Isaac Newton discovered a set of laws which are able to describe, with very great
accuracy, the extremely complex motions of all of the objects in our solar system. Yet
the laws themselves are extremely simple. How was that possible? It is possible because
Newton was able to isolate most of the complexity in the initial conditions of the problem.
These initial conditions are apparently not constrained by any law, and hence they can
vary in a very complex way. They have to be determined by direct observation. Newton
assures us that he can predict the motion of the system provided that we supply him
with precise details of the positions and velocities of the objects at some initial time.
Conversely, no matter how thoroughly we understand the dynamical laws of a system, we
will not be able to describe its motion unless we are provided with the initial conditions.
Similarly here: even if we feel confident that our ensemble of universes contains mem-
bers with the “right” physical laws and parameters (such as the vacuum energy), we
cannot say whether the ensemble is likely to contain even one member resembling our
Universe until we can answer this question: how hard is it to produce a baby universe
with initial conditions not too dissimilar to those of our Universe?
The answer to this question is (roughly) known: it was given by Roger Penrose [7]
in 1979. Penrose observed that the second law of thermodynamics, the statement that
the entropy of an isolated system can (almost) never decrease, implies that the entropy
1There is of course a body of philosophical opinion which controverts this distinction. Few physicists
sympathise; see however [6].
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of the Universe at the beginning of time must have been very low, compared with the
value it might have had. One can make this more quantitative after the manner familiar
in statistical mechanics, as follows.
The basic concept we need is that of the “phase space” of a dynamical system. This
is just an abstract mathematical space, introduced (in this context) over a century ago
by Josiah Willard Gibbs, in which each point represents one possible state of the system.
In practice, many states are indistinguishable, so one speaks of the system occupying a
certain volume in phase space. To say that the entropy of a system is low is to say that
it occupies a volume in the appropriate phase space which is small compared to the full
volume accessible to it. The volume in phase space corresponding to the actual initial
conditions of our observable Universe can be roughly estimated, and Penrose computed
the full volume, using the then recently developed theory of the thermodynamics of black
holes. How much larger is this full phase space volume, the volume that was open to the
earliest Universe, of which it somehow failed to take advantage? Penrose computes the
ratio to be about
P ≈ 1010123 . (2)
This number represents some fundamental property of our Universe; we propose to name
it the “Penrose number”. Note that the exponent in the Penrose number is itself exponen-
tial. Compared to this number, the Landscape begins to seem positively claustrophobic.
Dividing Penrose’s number by 10500 has, to an excellent approximation, no effect whatever.
The answer to our question — how hard can it be to build a baby universe with initial
conditions similar to the initial conditions of our Universe? — has turned out to be: it
is almost unimaginably hard. If we should propose to rely on “mere chance” to select
for us a universe from the Landscape, then our chances of obtaining the right value for
the vacuum energy are excellent, but the probability that this universe will resemble our
own is nevertheless essentially zero. For it will almost certainly have the wrong initial
conditions.
The conclusion, of course, is that we cannot rely on mere chance to build anything
that resembles our Universe. The Landscape is far, far too small for anything of that
sort to be possible. We commend this fact to the attention of those who maintain, on the
basis that 10500 is “large”, that the Landscape can account for any possible observation.
There are many possible responses to this line of argument, and we will discuss some
of them below. But the essential point is clear: no “mechanism for building universes”
can be considered satisfactory unless it addresses the size of the Penrose number in a
convincing way.
As is well known, Penrose’s calculation arose from his abiding concern with the problem
of the Arrow of Time. The macroscopic features of our world are massively asymmetric
in time. Eggs break when dropped; this process has never been seen to occur in reverse.
Since the seminal work of Ludwig Boltzmann, we have understood why this is so: in
modern terms, the intact egg occupies a vastly smaller domain in phase space than the
broken one. That is, being broken is a more generic state than being intact. The breaking
of the egg is then the entirely unsurprising process of the egg finding its way from less to
more generic states. This evolution from less generic to more generic is precisely what we
call the passage of time. (A discussion of this argument, and of the many subtleties we
have ignored here, may be found in reference [8].)
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The amazing aspect of this situation, then, is not the irreversible breaking of the egg
— it is the fact that intact eggs ever exist “in the first place”. With this basic insight in
hand, the existence of the Arrow that we observe now is readily traced back, through a
chain of steadily less generic states, to the earliest Universe. (The egg owes its existence
to a chicken, which in turn exists only because the Sun supplies us with a reliable source
of low-entropy photons, and the Sun exists because of low-entropy conditions billions of
years ago, and so on.) The real question is then: why was our Universe born in such an
ultra-low entropy state? What is the ultimate origin of the Arrow of Time?
One point we wish to make here is that the string Landscape can only be made to
work if we can find a concrete answer to this question. The need to answer it has suddenly
become a matter of the greatest urgency. If we cannot understand the Arrow, then we
will never know whether the Landscape has any physical relevance at all; for we will not
know whether any universe in the Landscape has the right initial conditions.
In this work, we will propose a solution of this problem. It is put forward not as the
last word on the subject, but to show that the — undeniably formidable — difficulties
which arise can be surmounted. The basic idea is to combine the initial-value theory for
gravity with certain deep theorems in global differential geometry to explain precisely how
the Arrow came into existence.
Our approach here will be resolutely string-theoretical. The problem of the Arrow of
Time can of course be posed in a broader context, and there is a large literature on the
subject from various points of view. The classic text, giving a complete treatment of the
background material, is that of Heinz-Dieter Zeh [9]; other indispensable sources are [10],
[11], [12], [13], and [14]. The new ideas advanced here are described in technical detail in
[15][16]; some recent alternative approaches are given in [17][18].
Let us begin with a survey of the difficulties which must be overcome by any theory
of the Arrow.
2. Why Is Understanding The Arrow A Hard Problem?
As befits a question of such fundamental importance, understanding the origin of the
Arrow is an extremely difficult problem. Let us try to be as specific as possible as to why
it is so hard.
2.1. Inflation Doesn’t Make an Arrow.
Inflation is the extremely successful idea [19] that our Universe is so large because of a
short but fantastically rapid period of expansion very early in the history of the Universe.
In this picture, the observed Universe (and, in fact, a vast region beyond it) is obtained,
by the passage of time, from a tiny region near the beginning. This theory has its critics,
but it is fair to say that it is now the standard theoretical framework for the physics of the
very early Universe. Basically, when one has a problem regarding the physics of that era,
one looks to Inflation for a solution2. One reason for the difficulty of the Arrow question
2The reader is nevertheless warned that the precise way in which Inflation arises in string theory is
not yet fully understood; see [20].
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is that this is one of the few problems that Inflation does not solve. Let us see why this
is so.
Unitarity can be described informally — mathematically precise definitions can be
given both in classical and in quantum mechanics — as the principle that information is
never completely lost (or created ex nihilo) in the evolution of any physical system. All
of the ordinary observed3 processes in nature obey this principle; which is not to say that
it cannot, in principle, be violated by very exotic processes.
Now it does not follow that a description or portrait of an object must have as many
possible states as the object itself. An atlas of maps of the Earth certainly has a smaller
range of possible states than the Earth itself. This is of course by no means paradox-
ical, since it is clearly understood that the art of making maps consists in deliberately
disregarding irrelevant information in order to present more important data; that is, car-
tography is a process in which information is discarded, not destroyed. To many physicists,
it seems “natural” that the inflationary “initial region” contained very little information:
after all, it was extremely small, whereas the current Universe is enormously large; one is
tempted to think of the early universe as a sort of plan or map. But — Sean Carroll and
Jennifer Chen [13] have stressed this simple yet fundamental point — the early Universe
was not a map of the present world: it was that world. The latter is obtained from the
former simply by means of the passage of time, which is ordinarily taken to be a unitary
process. If unitarity holds, then the smallness of the initial region does not explain why
its entropy was so low.
Now one can certainly argue that the evolution of the Universe is no ordinary process;
perhaps it is precisely an “exotic” process which does violate unitarity, admittedly on a
massive scale. Indeed, as is well known, the “exotic” process of the evaporation of black
holes was long widely believed to violate unitarity [21], and the arguments in favour of
that belief were very cogent. This was not considered to be contradictory, because black
hole evaporation is certainly outside the range of our ordinary (or other) experience.
Despite this, it is rapidly becoming the consensus view that black hole evaporation does
not violate unitarity. This unexpected development is due to the discovery of “AdS/CFT
duality” in string theory. Very briefly, this is the idea that quantum-gravitational pro-
cesses, such as black hole evaporation, can be completely described by a certain (“dual”)
quantum field theory. Since this latter is fully unitary, so also must be the physics gov-
erning the equivalent evaporating black hole [22].
This development has convinced many that unitarity is always strictly preserved in
string theory. But if one accepts this, it follows, as we have seen, that the mere fact
that our Universe has inflated does not explain the Arrow of Time in the context of
string theory. Once again, we see that a recent development in string theory has greatly
increased the urgency of solving the problem of the Arrow. For if we believe in unitarity,
then the initial region must have had the potential to acquire an amount of entropy that
is stupefyingly large compared to its size. The situation is analogous to opening an atlas
of world maps, putting a certain map under a microscope, and seeing oneself represented
accurately on the page. Indeed, it is far more astonishing than that.
3Here and henceforth, we use the term “observer” in the metaphorical sense traditional in relativity,
that is, to mean a timelike curve, usually a geodesic. Absolutely no “anthropic” connotations are intended ;
“observers” in our sense exist at all times in every universe.
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In short, Inflation means that a recent development in string theory — the confirma-
tion of the universality of unitarity — only really makes sense if we can solve the problem
of the Arrow. Conversely, if we wish to solve that problem within string theory, we have
to do it without appealing to Inflation.
In fact, the situation is exactly the reverse: Inflation depends on low-entropy initial
conditions in order to get started. To see this, recall that Inflation is driven by a scalar
field, the “inflaton”, denoted ϕ. Generically, such a field depends strongly on position
both in time and in space: that is, generically, its space and time derivatives, ∂µ ϕ (where
µ is an index labelling the three space directions, plus time), will not be close to zero. The
distribution of energy and momentum in the inflaton field is given by its stress-energy-
momentum tensor Tµν , which takes the form
Tµν = ∂µϕ ∂νϕ − 1
2
gµν (g
αβ ∂αϕ ∂βϕ − V (ϕ)). (3)
Here gµν is the metric tensor familiar from General Relativity, there is a summation
implied over the indices α and β, and V (ϕ) is a scalar function of ϕ called the inflaton
potential. We need not discuss the details: it is intuitively clear from this expression that
the energy stored in ϕ can be distributed in a vast variety of ways. But for Inflation
to begin, the energy must be distributed in an extremely special way; Inflation will only
occur if, to an excellent approximation, all of the derivatives of ϕ are initially zero, and
the potential is positive. For then we have
Tµν ≈ 1
2
gµν V (ϕ), (4)
and it is well known that energies of this kind lead to a rapidly accelerated expansion
(since then the potential behaves like a positive cosmological constant). One says, in
view of (4), that Inflation begins with the inflaton in its “potential-dominated state” [10].
The point is that the potential-dominated state is clearly an extremely non-generic state
for the inflaton: that is, Inflation can only begin if the inflaton has somehow been put
into this very low-entropy state. Inflation depends on the existence of an Arrow of Time,
which must have been established before Inflation began.
This should not be construed as a criticism of Inflation. On the contrary, Inflation
gives us an enormous simplification of the problem of explaining the Arrow. As Huw
Price has emphasised [11], we are by no means entitled a priori to assume that the low
initial entropy of our Universe was “stored” in a simple way or confined to a single form
of matter. Inflation performs precisely this service: it implies that the entire, potentially
vastly complicated problem of accounting for the entropy of the early Universe reduces
to the single problem of accounting for the initial state of the inflaton. In the words of
Lisa Dyson, Matthew Kleban, and Leonard Susskind [12]: “Some unknown agent initially
started the inflaton high up on its potential, and the rest is history.” In fact, at stake
here is the reason why there was any history: if we can understand the “unknown agent”,
then, thanks to Inflation, we will have a theory of the “passing” of time.
In short: the first reason for the extreme difficulty of our problem is that while Inflation
is undoubtedly a crucial part of the puzzle — later we shall see that it is even more
important than is apparent from this discussion — it assumes a pre-existing Arrow; so
we are deprived of a major technical resource.
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2.2. Laws of Nature vs Initial Conditions
To say that the very early Universe had “low” entropy is not to say much; this vagueness,
indeed, is one of the obstacles to understanding the origin of the Arrow. Fortunately,
as we have already discussed, Penrose has solved this problem for us, in terms of the
fundamental number P (equation (2)). We are searching for an explanation of “low”
entropy, where “low” is quantified by the fantastically small number 1/P .
However, the extreme smallness of this number is itself another factor in the difficulty
of explaining the Arrow. We have seen that string theory can naturally give rise to “large”
numbers, such as 10500, and the reciprocal of this is, by any normal standard, an extremely
small number. But it is still vastly too large compared to 1/P . What kind of theory could
possibly generate numbers of this order?
One possible answer to this question can be stated in simple language as follows: in an
eternal universe, everything can happen, even something with probability of order 1/P .
Of course, something so improbable will happen rarely, but what of that? Just wait.
This “just wait” argument goes back to Boltzmann himself ([23]; see [11] for a clear
discussion of this theory). The idea is simply that the extremely low entropy of the early
Universe was due to a random fluctuation, such as must always occur in any system
at equilibrium, given enough time. The subsequent history of the Universe is just the
normal return to the prior equilibrium state. In essence, Boltzmann and his successors
claim to solve the problem of the Arrow by outbidding Penrose: to his number P they
respond with a (supposedly) infinite supply of time. (There is also a spatial version of
this argument: in a spatially infinite universe, everything, no matter how improbable,
will happen somewhere. All of our strictures on the “just wait” argument apply, mutatis
mutandis, to this version.)
This idea, with its air of “getting something for nothing”, has a strong superficial
appeal; but its logical status is, in fact, very problematic. It is certainly far from clear,
for example, that everything can happen even with unlimited resources of time or space.
More seriously: why stop at “explaining” the initial conditions of the universe in this
way? The Universe we observe has many other “improbable” features; notably, it has
laws of nature; why not “explain” these, too, as apparent regularities such as must arise,
by mere chance, if one is prepared to wait sufficiently long? It is possible that Boltzmann’s
“rare fluctuation” can account for the low entropy at the beginning of time; but it is also
possible that the Universe fluctuated into existence last Thursday [24], complete with
suitable false evidence of being ancient. The mere fact that an explanation “works” does
not in any way oblige us to take it seriously. One suspects that the “just wait” technique
is applied exclusively to events in the remote past or future for a reason: the phenomena
are not present to reproach us with the extreme implausibility of this kind of argument.
Physical systems typically have characteristic time (and length) scales. One does not
expect plate tectonics to predict the motions of continents on microsecond time scales or
nanometre length scales. Similarly, the “just wait” philosophy can make sense only in
the context of a theory which incorporates (possibly vast but) finite characteristic time
and space scales. For these scales will impose discipline on the “just wait” philosophy;
requests for more time or space than the characteristic scales can be denied (unless one
has a mechanism explaining the unusual longevity of a specific system, which is not the
case here).
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Indeed, string theory does seem to have such scales. The known ways of constructing
string vacua resembling our Universe [25] (in that they have a positive cosmological con-
stant) certainly do not lead to universes that endure for arbitrarily long periods of time;
one says that the vacuum is “metastable”. One might wait uncounted aeons for Boltz-
mann’s “rare fluctuation” to occur, only to find that the system being examined has by
that time disappeared into baby universes which nucleated in the meantime4. Similarly,
the question as to whether the Universe is spatially infinite becomes somewhat ambiguous
in string theory: the “holographic principle” (see for example [26] and references) appar-
ently indicates that the regions beyond a cosmological horizon5 are in some sense merely a
redundant description of the data inside the horizon. This may well imply that something
that is very unlikely in one cosmological domain is in fact unlikely to occur anywhere.
In short, it is far from clear that, in reality, we do have the limitless resources of time
and space postulated by the “just wait” theories. String theory does allow for periods of
time and regions of space which are truly vast by any normal standard. Boltzmann-style
fluctuations might be legitimate objects of scientific interest if they occurred within those
allowances; this, however, is apparently not the case.
In fact, Boltzmann’s argument is usually held to fail [11] because of reasons connected
with the “anthropic principle”, the idea that the existence of intelligent life imposes non-
trivial conditions on physical theories. However, this principle has itself been strongly
criticised [14][27]. In our view, it is neither necessary nor desirable to become involved in
that highly contentious debate here. In fact, we feel that the entire “just wait” approach is
misconceived, both because of the remarks above and because of the following argument.
Normally, when we discover some “highly improbable” pattern in Nature, our reaction
is that the seeming improbability is really a sign of the existence of some hitherto unknown
law of Nature. When we discover, for example, that planetary orbits have the approximate
shape of an ellipse — a shape which has been known to be of mathematical interest for
thousands of years — nobody would think it an adequate response to point out that such
paths are bound to be traced out by randomly moving particles in the fullness of time.
Instead we search for a law, or a collection of laws (in this case, Newton’s laws of motion
and of gravitation). When these laws are understood, the improbable is transformed into
a certainty; elliptical orbits are an unavoidable consequence of the laws. Similarly here:
surely the normal scientific response to Penrose’s observation is that the initial conditions
of our Universe seem improbable only because we do not know the underlying law of
Nature.
In our view, Penrose’s calculation really means that the initial entropy was as low
as it is mathematically possible for it to be: in other words, “no greater than 1/P” is
really just a way of saying “exactly zero at the classical level”. Again, this is the kind
of statement which would result from the existence of some law of Nature governing the
initial conditions of the Universe.
Another way of stating the case is as follows. One might suppose that the low entropy
4One will always be able to find particular “fortunate” systems which evade this fate, since the babies
do not devour the entire space [13]. Sufficiently fortunate systems can endure far beyond the characteristic
time scale. Such an argument cannot be disproved; which is precisely why it should be rejected.
5A cosmological horizon is a surface surrounding a cosmological observer, such that objects beyond
it are forever invisible to that observer. Such horizons arise in cosmological models, such as de Sitter
spacetime, in which a positive vacuum energy dominates all other forms of matter.
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conditions at the beginning of time may have been selected by some kind of quantum-
mechanical probability distribution (defined on the “set of all initial conditions”). The
problem here is, once again, the sheer size of the Penrose number; somehow we have to
find a way of concentrating the wave-function over a particular outcome, and we must
concentrate it to an unheard-of degree. This suggests that we are dealing with a quantum-
mechanical version of a classical situation in which only a truly unique configuration is
possible. (That is, the classical probability distribution is a delta function.) But this is
tantamount to saying that we must find a (classical) law of Nature which dictates the
nature of this unique set of possible initial conditions.
This point of view has the following major advantage. One of the objections (dis-
cussed, for example, in reference [28]) to Boltzmann’s explanation of the second law of
thermodynamics is the following. We said that a system has low entropy if it is confined
to a small volume in phase space. This volume is occupied by a set of states which are in-
distinguishable from each other. But indistinguishability is to some extent a “subjective”
matter: it has something to do with the power of the observer to distinguish. (This pro-
cess of dividing up the phase space into sets of indistinguishable “micro-states” is known
as “coarse-graining”; see [10].) By requiring the initial state to be absolutely unique at
the classical level, the law of Nature we seek helps to resolve this problem.
This imposition of a law on initial conditions puts us, however, in a very unfamiliar
situation. As we discussed in the Introduction, it was one of Newton’s great insights that
extremely complex behaviour can be understood in terms of very simple laws precisely by
rigorously separating laws from initial conditions. Thus, another reason for the difficulty
of our problem is that it requires us to find a way of breaking down this traditional
separation.
Of course, one could simply declare that the new law is: “entropy must be as low as
possible at the beginning of time”. This is not satisfactory because it is not related to, and
does not flow from, our other theories of the early Universe: Inflation and string theory.
The new law should be connected with Inflation; and it should, ideally, be an inescapable
consequence of the mathematical structure of string theory. But these statements do not
make the problem any easier.
2.3. Low Entropy is a Geometric Property
Thus far, we have spoken of “low entropy” in a rather vague way. In order to progress,
we need to refine this expression. The way to do this was pointed out, once again, by
Penrose [7].
We begin by noting that, by the time the Universe had evolved to the point where
its contents are directly observable by us (that is, the stage called “decoupling”), most
of these contents are by no means in a low entropy state. On the contrary, the cosmic
microwave background has nearly all of the characteristics of a high entropy state: its
spectrum is that of a black body. The only only hint of the extreme “specialness” that
defines a low-entropy state is the extreme spatial uniformity of the radiation: to a good
approximation, it looks the same in all directions. One interprets this as a sign of low
gravitational entropy, as follows.
The precise way in which we should compute the entropy associated with a gravita-
tional field is not yet fully understood, but the existence of black hole entropy (associated
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with its horizon, see for example [29]) assures us that the concept does make sense. Now
the natural tendency of gravitational systems (except in circumstances which do not hold
here — see section 3.2 below) is to become clumped, indicating that gravitational entropy
is somehow related to the “degree of clumping”. But the cosmic background radiation,
despite its thermal character, is extremely uniformly distributed: it is hardly clumped at
all. Thus, in “looking” at the microwave background, we are observing a system in which
the gravitational entropy, and only the gravitational entropy, is low. This very strongly
suggests that “low entropy” in the very earliest Universe, even when we cannot observe
it directly, really means “low gravitational entropy.”
Now General Relativity teaches us that gravitation is nothing but a manifestation of
the geometry of spacetime. Therefore, low entropy for gravitation must correspond to
the spacetime geometry taking some very special form; “specialness” here actually means
extreme spatial uniformity. This refines our problem very substantially: the problem of
explaining the low entropy of the early Universe has been reduced to explaining its spatial
uniformity.
This point is of such fundamental importance that we should expand on it. Think of a
two-dimensional sphere. It has a characteristic topology, expressed in this simple case by
saying that it is compact and has genus zero (it has no “holes”). It also has a distinguished
geometry associated with a perfectly round shape. But clearly there are infinitely many
other geometries compatible with this topology: one can deform the two-sphere to an
arbitrarily complex shape without tearing any holes in it. The perfectly round shape
is obviously very “special”; a typical geometry, chosen randomly from the space of all
possible shapes with spherical topology, will look nothing like this. Furthermore, two
such typical shapes will be hard to distinguish, just as it would be difficult to say whether
two clouds resemble each other. In the language we have been using: the perfectly round
spherical geometry corresponds to low gravitational entropy. Similar comments apply to
other spaces. For example, the familiar flat geometry described by Cartesian coordinates
is the geometry with the “lowest possible entropy” on a space with that topology.
The general situation is as follows. For a topological space with a given number of
dimensions, it turns out that there is a measure of the amount of symmetry that a given
geometry can have in a neighbourhood of any point6. There is a maximum possible
“amount of symmetry” in each dimension, and certain topologies allow this maximum to
be realised by particular geometries; the topologies of interest to us here are of this kind.
Penrose’s calculations indicate that the earliest spatial sections of our spacetime were, to
a precision given at worst by the reciprocal of Penrose’s number, similar to some such
maximally symmetric three-dimensional space.
This actually ties in rather beautifully with our earlier discussion of Inflation. We
saw that the latter depends on the existence of some “unknown agent” which is capable
of putting the inflaton into its potential-dominated state initially. Now the extremely
symmetric geometries we are dealing with here have the property of being everywhere
locally isotropic: that is, the geometry “looks the same in all directions” to an arbitrar-
ily situated observer7 (who cannot however see arbitrarily far — hence the “locally”).
6Technically, this measure is the maximal dimensionality of the isometry groups of the metrics induced
on open sets containing the point.
7Except in certain very special spacetimes, isotropy can only be seen by a unique family of observers,
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Now suppose that we can show that the inflaton field must share the symmetries of the
underlying three-dimensional space. Energy cannot flow under such conditions, because
the direction of flow would define a “special” local direction, which is precisely what local
isotropy forbids. In fact, under these conditions, physical fields are forbidden to define
any special direction. But this is a formidable restriction indeed, because most physical
fields are defined, at a fundamental level, by vectors, which, by their very nature, do
define a direction. In fact, the only way a vector can be isotropic is by being exactly zero.
But the spatial derivatives of the inflaton define a vector. Thus, if the field shares the
symmetries of the underlying space, a perfectly locally isotropic spatial geometry forces
the spatial derivatives of the inflaton to vanish.
This goes very far — though we still have to explain the smallness of the initial time
derivative of the inflaton — towards putting the inflaton in its lowest-entropy state, just
as we wanted. More than that: this argument strongly suggests that the earliest form of
matter probably was a scalar field, precisely as Inflation postulates. For a scalar field can,
unlike a fundamental vector field, be non-zero even in conditions of perfect isotropy8. In
short, extreme spatial symmetry, interpreted as local isotropy around every point, is an
ideal candidate for the “unknown agent” which started Inflation, and the argument we
are developing here is, more generally, extremely natural from the inflationary point of
view.
In the previous section we asked: what kind of theory can give rise to “low” entropy
on the kind of scale measured by 1/P ? Our discussion here reduces this to: what kind of
theory can give rise to geometric symmetry (more precisely: local isotropy at each point)
with such fantastic accuracy? Notice that, by sharpening the question in this way, we
are drastically raising the bar for any proposed explanation. A theory which “merely”
predicts ultra-low entropy is not good enough; it has to predict low entropy of a specific,
geometric, form.
A good example of what we have in mind here is provided by one of the most carefully
thought-out proposals for explaining the Arrow, due to Carroll and Chen [13]. In this
theory, baby universes (of a particular kind, see below) branch off from a mother universe
by means of a rare fluctuation in the inflaton field, a fluctuation upwards to a higher-
energy equilibrium. The basic idea is that the mother is in a high entropy state (which is
generic, hence not itself in need of explanation) but the baby is in a low entropy state. As
one would expect from this, however, this theory demands Boltzmannian patience9 as we
await the nucleation of a baby universe with sufficiently low entropy; that is, the Carroll-
Chen theory is a “just wait” theory par excellence. In this sense, in fact, the theory is
much like Boltzmann’s. The difference lies in the claim that Boltzmann’s scenario arises
naturally as a consequence of the modern understanding of early-universe physics and
spacetime dynamics.
One way to explain how this theory works (that is, why the upward fluctuation of the
inflaton produces a low-entropy state) is as follows. Let us assume that the spacetimes
who are distinguished by that very fact.
8A similar argument applies to spinor fields. Note that tensor fields can be non-trivial even when they
are perfectly isotropic; it is the fact that general relativity represents the gravitational field by a tensor
which permits non-trivial isotropic cosmologies.
9Carroll and Chen estimate the relevant probability to be ≈ 10− 1010
56
, a figure which induces awe
and presbyopia in equal measure.
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of both mother and child can be approximated by de Sitter spacetime, but with a much
larger (inflationary) value of the cosmological constant for the baby than for the parent.
Now, like the horizon of a black hole, the cosmological horizon of de Sitter spacetime
has an entropy associated with it. Large values of the cosmological constant correspond
to lower entropy, so this is consistent with the claim that the mother has much higher
entropy than the baby. Thus the theory “explains” why the inflaton was in a low-entropy
state initially.
This argument is, however, circular. The usual formula [30] for de Sitter entropy (in
terms of the horizon area) is of course derived using de Sitter spacetime geometry, which
is maximally spatially symmetric by assumption. If the baby’s spatial sections were, on
the contrary, extremely anisotropic, then we would have no grounds for using the de Sitter
entropy formula to estimate its entropy (which in that case would in fact not be low, or
at least not low enough). Thus, the Carroll-Chen proposal will only work if one can show
that the baby is born with very isotropic spatial sections. The above calculation of the
baby’s entropy in terms of the value of its inflationary potential is certainly consistent
with a possible solution of our problem; but in itself it does not provide an explanation,
because it does not address the fact that “low entropy” really means “extreme initial
spatial isotropy around every point”.
In fact, if the mother universe has high entropy, this means that its spatial sections are
not highly isotropic around each point; they must be highly irregular (and hence not like
those of de Sitter spacetime); and yet the mother must give birth to extremely isotropic
babies. Explaining how that can happen is precisely the difficulty.
We will see later that the Carroll-Chen theory can in fact be interpreted so that it
deals with this problem. For the moment, the point we are making is that there is little
hope of explaining the Arrow unless we can address the problem of spatial regularity
directly. The remainder of the explanation will then follow.
Our emphasis on isotropy is motivated by Penrose’s “Weyl Curvature Hypothesis” [7].
Penrose postulates that the initial geometric “specialness” takes the form of a demand
that a certain piece of the spacetime curvature tensor, the Weyl tensor, should vanish at
initial singularities (and only there10). This demand does ensure local isotropy around
each point “in” the initial singularity. However, there is a serious problem here: most
physicists hope that the presence of singularities in the standard cosmological models is
misleading. A full understanding of the initial state should reveal it to be non-singular.
How can Penrose’s idea be adapted to this case?
In our view, local isotropy around every point is in any case the heart of the matter,
and one might as well try to impose it directly. This has the great advantage that it
applies also to the case of an entirely non-singular cosmology. But it also forces us to
confront a central technical difficulty.
Once we accept that the origin of the Arrow is reducible to explaining the “special”
geometry of the earliest spatial sections of the Universe, we can frame the problem in
the language of statistical mechanics as follows. Consider the set of all possible three-
dimensional Riemannian manifolds. Think of this as a “phase space”. In this phase space,
the subset of manifolds which are everywhere locally isotropic is a fantastically tiny sub-
10A more precise technical formulation is that spacetime should be “conformally compactifiable” at
initial singularities.
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space. It consists of familiar geometries like that of the perfectly round three-dimensional
sphere, or of perfectly flat spaces, or of geometries like that of hyperbolic space, the space
having constant negative curvature. The generic three-dimensional geometry is nothing
like any of these, even approximately : one should picture it as a wildly distorted “blob”,
corresponding indeed to just what we mean when we say that something is “shapeless”.
We stress that it is not enough just to study spaces with geometries which are obtained
by making small perturbations around the perfectly isotropic spaces. For even these will
sample an insignificant region in the full phase space.
To see more concretely what we mean by this, let us consider one of the most sophis-
ticated attempts to derive an Arrow of Time from a more basic formalism, the one due
to Stephen Hawking [31] and his collaborators [32]. Here one uses the well-known “no
boundary” version of quantum cosmology to study inhomogeneous perturbations around
an assumed perfectly isotropic background. A subtle technical argument leads to the
conclusion that the perturbations are “born” in their ground state, and thereafter grow,
defining an Arrow of the appropriate (geometric) kind. This is undoubtedly an extremely
important check of the consistency of the no-boundary approach with the existence of an
Arrow of the kind we observe. But in itself it does not solve the main problem, since the
perfect isotropy of the background is assumed.
The problem here is that the full phase space is truly vast and very difficult to describe
in detail — even in the case of two dimensions, it is hard to describe the “generic” shape
into which a sphere can be deformed — and correspondingly “hard to manage”. By this
we mean something specific: there are very few mathematical theorems which operate at
this level of generality. A typical theorem in differential geometry will begin with much
more restrictive assumptions: as for example, “consider the set of compact manifolds with
curvature constrained in the following manner...” Theorems of the form: “Consider the
set of all compact three-dimensional manifolds...” are rare indeed. This set is simply too
large and its contents too various and hard to characterize.
Even if we had the relevant theorem, it could only lead us to a conclusion if we were
able to apply it to some well-justified physical assumptions. But it is very likely that the
conditions we can justify will be extremely weak. They will, for example, pertain only to
the spatial surface along which the Universe came into being, not to the entire subsequent
history. They will not involve strong assumptions about the behaviour of matter in the
beginning, because we have no reason to believe that matter behaved, at that time, in
ways familiar to us now.
An example of the kind of argument we have in mind was advanced in an important
work of Gary Gibbons and James Hartle [33], who attempted to show, using a powerful
theorem in global differential geometry, that the initial spatial section of the Universe must
have been a perfectly round three-dimensional sphere. The argument does not assume
that the geometry must be approximately spherical; it surveys the entire region of the
phase space compatible with its physical assumptions. Unfortunately, those assumptions
are much too strong, to the extent that they are almost certainly not satisfied by the
actual Universe. (See [34] for a detailed discussion of these conditions.) Furthermore, in
the context of Inflation, the discussion in [33] effectively assumes that the inflaton has
been put into its minimal-entropy (potential-dominated) state; but we have argued that
this state must be a consequence of the existence of an Arrow. So the conditions needed
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here are far too restrictive.
Thus, we have another reason for the difficulty of our problem: despite our efforts to
refine it, it remains at a level of generality such that technical resources are scant. We
need a technique which can take the very mild physical conditions that we are entitled
to impose at the beginning of time, and transform them into an enormously restrictive
constraint on the truly vast phase space of initial geometries. In addition, it has to force
the inflaton to share the symmetries of the resulting geometry, and it will also have to
restrict the way the initial spatial slice is embedded in spacetime (so that it can tell us
something about the initial time derivative of the inflaton). The reader can be excused
for doubting that such a magical technique exists at all.
2.4. In My Beginning Is My End
Thus far, we have spoken as if our sole task is to explain the peculiar conditions which
obtained at the creation of a universe. If we can perform this task, however, then we should
be able to understand the behaviour of the Arrow everywhere in spacetime, including at
the destruction of a universe. Indeed, an inability to answer such questions would be a
strong indication that something is wrong with our theory. Note that some universes in
the Landscape have negative vacuum energy, which does indeed cause them to destroy
themselves; thus we cannot evade this question by noting that our Universe shows no
signs of mortality. Furthermore, even in our Universe, spacetime is “destroyed” inside
black holes. We need to be able to predict what the Arrow would be like for observers in
less salubrious circumstances than our own.
Most of us feel intuitively that initial conditions completely fix the fate of a universe,
that its end is implicit in (and different from) its beginning. That is, we feel that there
are no “special conditions” when a universe is destroyed; we find it hard to accept that
the direction of the Arrow can somehow “flip”, as it would have to do if conditions near
the destruction of a universe are as special as those near its creation. Can this intuition
be justified — or is it no more than a prejudice? Certainly, the arguments that we
instinctively raise against a symmetry between creation and destruction seem invariably
to convict us of “cosmic hypocrisy”: we find ourselves arguing about cosmic destruction
in ways which we would not dream of applying to the creation. It is no use saying, for
example, that low entropy in (what we call) the future is “highly improbable”: that is true,
but it is equally true that low entropy in the past is “highly improbable”; it is absurdly
improbable, yet it was indeed so. Price [11] has dissected many fallacious arguments of
this kind.
Despite this, we propose to argue that our intuitions are not misleading us in this case:
we will claim that there are indeed no “special conditions” at the destruction of a universe.
We can begin to clarify these issues by eliminating one major source of confusion: the
expansion and (in some cases) contraction of universes.
The observed thermodynamic Arrow runs parallel to the expansion of the Universe.
Since the former is generally agreed to have a cosmological origin, one sometimes speaks
also of a “cosmological Arrow”. It is then natural to ask whether there is some kind of
link between the two. In fact, some authors — see [28] for a particularly eloquent defence
of this idea — have gone to the extreme of arguing that the thermodynamic Arrow is a
consequence of the cosmological Arrow.
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It is important to understand that this idea cannot be correct if Boltzmann’s inter-
pretation of the passage of time, accepted here and by most authors, is valid. For if
the thermodynamic Arrow depends on the cosmological Arrow, it follows that the former
could not exist if the Universe did not expand. But recall that Boltzmann pointed out
that the problem of the Arrow reduces to explaining the special initial conditions of our
world; if that can be understood, then the subsequent evolution towards more generic
states is only to be expected, and it will occur whether or not the Universe expands.
In fact, granted that we can somehow explain the special initial conditions, entropy will
increase, at least initially, even if the Universe always contracts.
If we accept Boltzmann’s account of the basis of the second law, then, it follows
that the expansion and contraction of a universe are irrelevant distractions as far as
understanding the Arrow is concerned. The real question is this. Consider a universe
which is both created and destroyed: is there any justification for thinking that “special”
conditions, such as spatial uniformity, can be imposed at one “end” of the universe and
not the other? (While we argue that the expansion of the Universe is not responsible
for the Arrow, it is of course still possible that both the expansion and the Arrow have
a common origin. This is precisely what happens in the theory of the Arrow discussed
below and in [15].)
If a universe has two “ends”, then the only difference between the ends is precisely
the difference, if there is one, between creation and destruction. Now it may be that
these two words have no meaning apart from the one given to them by the existence of
an Arrow: “creation” may be another name for the low-entropy end, “destruction” may
be a name for the high-entropy end. But this is not at all obvious. Why should the
degree of “specialness” of the state of the universe have anything to do with its coming
into existence? How high does the entropy have to be before one is allowed to destroy a
universe? One can all too easily imagine a universe that is created in a generic state, and
remains in that state until it is destroyed. The alternative claim, that such a universe is
a logical impossibility, seems far-fetched. Certainly the onus is on those who assert this
to prove it.
We shall assume, therefore, that “creation” and “destruction” have some meanings
which are logically prior to the Arrow; that is, they might be meaningful even in universes
which do not have an Arrow. Nevertheless, if an Arrow does exist, it has to conform itself
to these meanings: it would clearly be unpleasant to find oneself saying eventually that a
certain universe “began by being destroyed”. It should be possible to show that entropy
was low at the creation, and will be high at the destruction. This will have the consequence
that there are no “special conditions” at the destruction.
All this seems very reasonable. Once again, however, we are asking for a great deal
here. First, we must formulate the distinction between creation and destruction in con-
crete mathematical language. Then we must find a mechanism which imposes special
conditions on the “creation end”, and which somehow fails to do so at the “destruction
end” of a universe. It is one thing to make “reasonable” assertions about these matters,
quite another to establish (or even formulate) them mathematically. We have yet another
major obstacle to overcome.
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2.5. Summary
The difficulties we have discussed give rise to an intimidating list:
• First, we cannot rely on Inflation to help us; Inflation needs an Arrow in order to
get started.
• Second, it seems unlikely that we will obtain an Arrow (of the kind we actually
observe) simply by waiting, in the manner of a Boltzmann. Instead we need some-
thing more akin to a new law of Nature which, unlike any other, constrains the
initial conditions of the Universe.
• Third, this law must somehow constrain the geometry of the initial spatial section,
by means of some technique which has the power to probe the entire vast space of
all possible three-dimensional geometries.
• Finally, the theory should determine the behaviour of the Arrow of Time not just
in the vicinity of the beginning of time, but throughout spacetime, including near
its destruction. If we assert that one end of a universe is dissimilar to the other, we
have to prove this.
Having summarized the worst of our difficulties, we can now propose an approach to
solving them. We begin by discussing the currently favoured way of making universes,
the nucleation of babies.
3. Bringing Up Baby
In the Landscape, a universe begins as the baby of some mother universe. In this section
we argue that the baby universe will not spontaneously develop an Arrow; it can only
inherit one from its mother. If all mothers were themselves originally babies, it seems
that no universe will have an Arrow. Let us explain the argument and see where it directs
us.
3.1. The Universe as a Branch System
When we observe a system in an unusually low entropy state, we invariably find that it
owes that low entropy to a process involving a larger system. The overall entropy of that
larger system need not be small; all that is needed is that (a) the part that goes into
making the smaller system should have low entropy, and (b) the process of “splitting”
should not itself greatly increase the entropy of that part. For example, if I wish to
cool my vodka, I go to the refrigerator (by no means a system with low total entropy,
by the standards of the glass of vodka) and split off a low-entropy sub-system, to wit,
a block of ice. I convey this sub-system to my vodka, but I must take care to do this
without destroying its icy state. In principle one could extract ice from a refrigerator
using dynamite, but this is unlikely to produce satisfactory results; the splitting of the
system alone does not yield a refreshing low-entropy drink: one needs to do it in the right
way.
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A low-entropy system obtained in this manner is said to be a branch system of the
larger system. The existence of branch systems is what allows the enormous complexity
of our world, despite the relentless increase of overall entropy demanded by the second
law of thermodynamics.
It is natural to guess that our own Universe may be a branch system of some larger
system, and that this may account for the low initial entropy of the world we observe. Of
course this does not in itself solve the problem of the Arrow, but we may hope to shift
that problem to a venue where it may be more easily addressed.
A good example of this way of thinking is provided by the theory of Carroll and Chen
[13] discussed earlier. Recall that the idea here is that the observed Universe, among
countless others, splits off as a baby universe from some much larger and older universe.
That older world may have a large overall entropy, but its entropy density could be small;
if the baby nucleates over a small region, and if it is born in the right way, it will begin
with only a small amount of entropy, in the manner typical of a branch system.
Now there are three fundamental questions which have to be answered before this
“baby universe as a branch system” idea can be said to work. First, of course, we have
to ask why the larger universe should have a low (geometric) entropy density; secondly,
we have to determine whether, and in what precise sense, baby universe nucleation does
indeed take place in a small region of spacetime; and finally, we must convince ourselves
that the splitting off of the baby does not increase its entropy to an unacceptable degree.
3.2. The Importance of Being Baldest
In the case of the Carroll-Chen theory, we can try to answer the first question as follows.
We try to use the idea, familiar from discussions of Inflation, that an accelerated expansion
of space (due, for example, to the presence of positive vacuum energy) will in some sense
make the spatial sections more smooth. The intuitive picture here is that space is like
a rubber sheet; as it is stretched, it becomes smoother. Presumably, if one is willing
(and able) to wait sufficiently long, this process will produce spatial sections which are
as smooth as we know the early spatial sections of our Universe to have been. The end
result of this kind of smoothing is usually called cosmic baldness.
Now in fact the process of cosmic balding is not as simple as the “rubber sheet” anal-
ogy might suggest; see for example [35] for a taste of the rather formidable technicalities.
It is not true, in particular, that an accelerating spacetime must globally come to resem-
ble de Sitter spacetime. The balding process only takes place within the cosmological
event horizon of an individual inertial observer; roughly speaking this is because of the
exponential decay of the proportion of a spatial slice accessible to a single observer. (See
[36] for a clear recent discussion of this crucial point.)
In fact, this more subtle interpretation of cosmic baldness is exactly what is needed
for the Carroll-Chen theory to work. For what it implies is that the mother universe, even
if it accelerates, never becomes isotropic at the global level: that is, its “total geometric
entropy” is large. However, each local inertial observer does see a low geometric entropy in
his immediate neighbourhood; the geometric entropy density is small. Thus we see that
cosmic baldness, properly interpreted, allows us to answer the objection raised earlier
against the Carroll-Chen theory (that it did not appear to give rise to low geometric
entropy in the baby universe).
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On the other hand, one must be careful regarding the meaning of “observer” here:
in cosmology, an “observer” can be an entire galaxy or even a group of galaxies. Even
the local smoothing-out effect of the accelerated expansion only operates on larger length
scales than this, and, in fact, the observed acceleration in our Universe is not capable of,
for example, tearing the Milky Way apart. Actually, even the Local Group of galaxies
can resist the repulsion for an indefinite period [37]. Thus the geometry of space within
the Local Group will never be smoothed out by the accelerated expansion taking place
on very large scales, as long as the galactic matter remains within the current confines of
the Local Group.
Carroll and Chen, however, propose another way to scatter the Local Group to the
winds. They ask us to wait until essentially all of the matter in these galaxies has fallen
into black holes, and then to wait for these black holes to evaporate. Presumably the
resulting radiation will cease to be bound. In effect, this process contracts the “observer”
from the size of the Local Group to smaller and smaller scales. Eventually, one might
hope, the “observer” will become so small that the smoothing effect of cosmic acceleration
can operate over the tiny length scales on which baby universes nucleate. After a further
period of waiting, this might cause such a patch to become smooth on scales measured by
Penrose’s number P . A baby which is born at this point has at least some hope of being
born with a geometric entropy as low as that of the early stages of our Universe.
We have already expressed our reservations about whether one should really be pre-
pared, particularly if one is a string theorist, to do this truly stupendous amount of
waiting, and we need not rehearse that discussion here. The point to be stressed is that
this is a very delicate construction, which could easily malfunction even if one is blessed
with Boltzmannian patience.
Nevertheless we do seem to be making some progress, so let us proceed to the second
question, concerning the extent of the region over which baby universe nucleation takes
place. Carroll and Chen propose to rely on the mechanism of baby universe nucleation
proposed by Edward Farhi and Alan Guth [38] (see also [39]; note that this mechanism
differs radically from the one usually employed in discussions of the Landscape [3]). This
kind of baby universe is what one needs if, like Carroll and Chen, one wants to fluctu-
ate upwards to a higher inflationary equilibrium. Now the idea that Farhi-Guth baby
universes are possible in string theory has in fact been strongly challenged [40], and this
is a major problem for the Carroll-Chen theory. But let us leave that to one side for
the moment, and note that Farhi-Guth baby universes do in fact branch off from a small
spatial region in the mother universe. If we can accept the argument that the latter has
achieved an ultra-low geometric entropy density by this time, then the baby will indeed
begin with the right properties if it can maintain its spatial regularity through the birth
process. This brings us to the third question.
3.3. It’s Not That Easy Being Born
Farhi and Guth showed that, in the absence of exotic matter (see below), the umbilical
cord joining mother and child is swiftly severed by a singularity. What this means is that
the spatial sections of the future baby shrink down to literally zero size in a finite time.
The presence of a singularity is of course unpleasant, but, for our purposes, the shrinking
to zero size itself is the real problem.
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To see why, recall that, locally, expanding a universe tends to make its spatial sections
more uniform — this was precisely how we are proposing to make the mother universe so
smooth, as seen by an individual observer. Equally, however, shrinking the spatial sections
tends to make them highly anisotropic. Any small blemish becomes increasingly apparent
as the sections shrink, and this happens very quickly when they become sufficiently small.
It turns out (see for example [41]) that the size of a spatial section can be quantified by a
certain function of time, a(t), and that, when the sections are small, the anisotropy grows
according to a(t)− 6; this of course diverges rapidly if a(t) is allowed to tend to zero. (It
diverges more rapidly than almost anything that might try to defeat it; the exceptions
[41][42] are not relevant to the Landscape.) If the spatial sections really shrink down to
zero size, then even the slightest anisotropy, even one measured on a scale comparable to
the reciprocal of Penrose’s number, will be magnified to an arbitrary extent. Our careful
smoothing of space has been in vain.
This is not very surprising: the birth of a baby universe (of any kind) should be
pictured as a highly traumatic event; certainly, if the reader has any reason to suspect
that a baby universe has nucleated in his immediate vicinity, then he is urged to keep his
distance, if not to take to his heels. But this is just a way of saying that we would not
expect the birth of a baby universe to be an event that would give rise to a low-entropy
situation, or to preserve any low-entropy systems which pre-date the birth. In other
words, one simply expects that the birth of a baby universe respects the second law of
thermodynamics, increasing the entropy as it proceeds. But, once again, “entropy” here
means geometric entropy; so we must expect that the birth tends to make the relevant
region less isotropic.
It has been argued [43] that quantum-mechanical effects allow the singularity in the
Farhi-Guth “wormhole” to be evaded; see [44] for a discussion of the merits of this. In
effect, the quantum fields behave like a kind of exotic matter, “exotic” in the sense that
it violates the Null Energy Condition, the requirement that the sum of the energy density
and the pressure of a fluid should never be negative; see [16] for references.
We can picture this situation by imagining that the exotic matter intervenes to prevent
the spatial sections of the baby universe from shrinking to exactly zero size. We must
still, in accordance with the second law, expect a certain amount of anisotropy to develop;
but now at least we have some hope of bounding the increase. A detailed theory would
have to show that the increase in the anisotropy is sufficiently small as to allow Inflation
to start in the baby. The general point, however, is that we can be sure that there will
be an increase. Thus the initial smoothness of the mother universe must have been even
more extreme than that of our own early Universe.
Many of these comments apply well beyond the particular scenario posited by Carroll
and Chen; they apply to any theory in which our Universe appears as a branch system,
splitting off as a baby universe in a larger mother universe. The key point is that, in
any such theory, we must find some effective way of forcing the mother universe to be
or become extremely isotropic. In the case of a baby connected to the mother by a
wormhole, it suffices to do this in the immediate vicinity of the place where the baby
nucleates; otherwise, the requirement has to be imposed on a much larger region of the
mother universe. In either case, the mother needs to be even more isotropic than the
baby. (Here and henceforth, “isotropic” means “locally isotropic at the relevant points”.)
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Since the Carroll-Chen theory is in any case committed to an extreme version of the
“just wait” philosophy, the necessary level of maternal isotropy can be achieved by waiting
for cosmic baldness to do its duty. (We assume that the entrance to the wormhole remains
small, so that its environs can always be described by a single observer.) Thus, putting
all of the many pieces together, and assuming that they all work, we do now have a
theory of the Arrow. In summary: we wait for a Farhi-Guth baby universe to nucleate in
some small region of a mother universe which does not have particularly uniform spatial
sections but which is accelerating. While we wait, cosmic baldness ensures that the local
region becomes smoother, while collapse to black holes and their subsequent evaporation
effectively re-defines the meaning of “local”, so that, when the baby does nucleate, it does
so in a region which is extremely smooth; so smooth that, even when the anisotropy grows
as the baby is born, the spatial sections are still as smooth as Penrose demands. The
baby universe then has an Arrow arising from this extreme initial smoothness.
This is an ingenious and charming story, but we hope that we can be excused for
not believing in it. First, the colossal time scales involved are likely to lead to very
serious problems even without going into anthropic questions; when we do go into them,
extremely long time scales can only make the situation worse (see for example [45]). Such
long time scales do not seem natural in string theory. Second, the mechanism whereby
the definition of “local” is tremendously contracted, from cosmological scales down to the
size of a typical region in which a wormhole can nucleate, does not seem to be sufficiently
reliable. Finally, it is very doubtful that Farhi-Guth baby universes are compatible with
string theory [40].
Nevertheless, the Carroll-Chen model does at least address all of the problems we
have identified, so it has much to teach us when we consider other proposed ways of
building universes. In particular, of course, we are interested in building universes in the
string Landscape. Here, too, one uses baby universes, but of a very different kind to
the ones discussed above: the ones proposed by Sidney Coleman and Frank De Luccia
[46]. This kind of baby reduces the value of the vacuum energy. It nucleates in a small
region but then expands very rapidly, for an indefinite period, into the mother spacetime,
instead of disappearing into a wormhole. Its fate therefore cannot be understood in terms
of the observations of a single observer11, and so cosmic baldness is of no help to this
kind of baby; the baby is no longer protected from outside influences, a fact which has
recently attracted some attention [47][48]. Furthermore, the spatial sections of the baby
are infinitely large; leaving aside perturbations, each spatial section is a copy of the three-
dimensional space of constant negative curvature (as we shall explain in more detail later).
They therefore present a large “target” for outside influences, and in fact every part of
the earliest spatial sections is causally related to events deep in the mother universe.
It is therefore clear that, as in the case of Farhi-Guth baby universes, the second law
of thermodynamics will apply here: if the mother universe is not smooth on large scales,
nor will the baby be smooth; in fact it will be less so12. The situation here is in fact even
worse, because we cannot appeal to cosmic baldness. This means that the total entropy
11Technically: because the boundary of the baby expands at a rate asymptotically approaching the
speed of light, the baby occupies a region of the relevant conformal diagram which cannot be contained
in the cosmological event horizon of a single inertial observer.
12As in the Farhi-Guth case, the growth of anisotropies has to be controlled by means of violations of
the Null Energy Condition; see [16].
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of the mother universe has to be extremely low if that of the baby is to be low: the second
law of thermodynamics can no longer be circumvented, as it was in the Carroll-Chen
theory, by contrasting total entropy with entropy density.
To be brief: baby universes are an important feature of the Landscape, but in them-
selves they do not help us to understand the Arrow of Time. In fact, they merely reca-
pitulate the problem on a higher level.
3.4. Haunted by the Past
A baby in the Landscape, then, will have an Arrow of Time only if its mother does: it has
to inherit an Arrow. Of course, it is all too clear that we have not solved the problem of
the Arrow in this way. Actually, we may have made it worse, because the mother has to
be at least as smooth as the baby. Furthermore, the mother itself may well be the baby
of some still larger “grandmother universe”, which was as smooth or smoother still; and
so on.
In our view, we have arrived at this impasse because we have tried to avoid the
conclusion of our discussion in Section 2.2. In fact, we have tried to use the baby universe
concept to avoid speaking of the beginning of time in any real sense. This has not worked.
Intuitively, anything which has a past will be influenced by that past; it cannot be as
smooth as Penrose’s calculation demands, unless its past was at least as smooth. The most
straightforward conclusion is that Penrose’s calculation really means that our Universe
ultimately arose from some system which simply had no past. In the context of baby
universes, this means that we must trace the origin of the Arrow back through the mother
universe, the grandmother, and so on, until we reach the original female ancestor. Let
us call this original universe “Eve”. By definition, then, Eve had no past whatever.
This made it possible, in some way to be explained, for Eve to begin with an Arrow; all
subsequent generations have an Arrow only because they inherited one from Eve.
Our task, then, is to explain how Eve acquired her Arrow.
4. All About Eve
Eve had no past, but nevertheless was subject to some kind of physical law. How can
that be? Can a universe really have no past?
Ideas of this sort first arose when Alexander Vilenkin [49] made the daring suggestion
that the Universe was created literally from nothing. (The celebrated “no boundary”
theory of Hartle and Hawking [50] can also be interpreted in a similar way.) It is, to put
it mildly, difficult to think about “the physics of nothing”, but string theory suggests a
way of doing so. It is generally felt [51] that, in some sense which today remains rather
vague, time itself is emergent in string theory. Of course, much remains to be done to
render this idea more precise, but the rough idea is that if one probes sufficiently far
back in time, one will reach a region beyond which time simply ceases to be meaningful.
Evidently, that region cannot have a past. According to our discussion, the boundary,
which we necessarily picture as a spacelike hypersurface, is where we must seek the real
origin of the Arrow.
The stringy “pre-emergence” state is not an alternative to Vilenkin’s idea, so much
as a way of giving a deeper analysis of “nothingness”. It certainly does seem problematic
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to speak of the Universe “existing” in the absence of time; see [52] for philosophical
background on such questions. We shall therefore continue to speak of the Universe being
created or destroyed along the surfaces which are boundaries between regions in which
time is well-defined and regions in which it is not. Let us try, then, to find a stringy
account of creation.
4.1. The Minimal Torus of Creation
What would “spacetime” be like if time did not exist? There is an apparently naive
yet ultimately profound answer to this question; it runs as follows. Take Minkowski
spacetime, the usual spacetime of Special Relativity. Distances in Minkowski spacetime
are measured using the Minkowski metric, given by
gM
−+++ = − dt2 + dx2 + dy2 + dz2 , (5)
where t denotes time, the other coordinates are the familiar Cartesian ones for the spatial
dimensions, and the pattern of signs, − + ++, is called the signature. Time is the
dimension corresponding to the aberrant sign in this formula. “Spacetime without time”
would be the “+ + ++” version of this formula,
gM++++ = + dt
2 + dx2 + dy2 + dz2 . (6)
This is described [50] as the Euclidean version of the original spacetime metric. (The
terminology is unfortunate: it means nothing more than that the metric has + + ++
signature; in particular, it certainly does not mean that the metric is flat.) Naively, then,
we expect time to emerge from a stringy state with Euclidean signature. In terms of
this oversimplified example, this means that time emerges at the point at which gM++++
is suddenly13 replaced by gM
−+++. Notice that each formula can be obtained from the
other by replacing t by it, where i is the usual imaginary unit,
√− 1. One says that this
coordinate has been complexified.
Thus we obtain a concrete picture of emergent time. This is a useful idea, however,
only if we can say something about the “pre-temporal”, Euclidean region.
Vilenkin and Hartle and Hawking made proposals as to the structure of the Euclidean
region; more recently, a radically different suggestion, based on string theory, was made
by Hirosi Ooguri, Cumrun Vafa, and Erik Verlinde [54]. They begin far from cosmology,
by studying a kind of stringy black hole, leading to a two-dimensional Euclidean metric
of the form
gOV V++ = K
2 e(2 ρ/L) dτ 2 + dρ2. (7)
Here one should think of ρ as a coordinate which runs along a line, but of τ as the
angular coordinate giving position on a circle, of radius related to the fixed number K.
(The constant L measures the curvature of this space.) Now the Euclidean “time” here
— that is, the dimension which would normally be complexified — is τ . (It is usual for
black hole Euclidean “time” to be compactified in this manner; the periodicity of “time”
is ultimately related to the thermodynamics of the black hole.) But Ooguri et al. noticed
that this metric looks very much like a cosmological metric: if we take ρ to be Euclidean
13We would argue that it is analytic that time cannot “emerge gradually”. But see [53].
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“time”, then the geometry is like a Euclidean version of an exponentially expanding
two-dimensional cosmos with finite (circular) “spatial” sections. The fact that a single
Euclidean space can have two spacetime interpretations opens the way to a profound
application of stringy black hole theory to cosmology.
The four-dimensional version of this geometry is just
gOV V++++ = dρ
2 + K2 e(2 ρ/L) ( dθ21 + dθ
2
2 + dθ
2
3). (8)
Here θ1, 2, 3 are angular coordinates on three separate circles. Such a product of circles is
called a three-dimensional torus. It may be pictured as the interior of a box with non-
trivial topology; as one tries to exit through a side, one instantly re-appears inside the box,
entering it from the opposite side; one says that the opposite sides have been topologically
identified. Thus, the cosmological version of this space will have spatial sections each of
which is a copy of a torus.
The torus has a property which turns out to be crucial here: it is finite (compact)
yet flat. That is, inside the box, all of the usual laws of flat-space geometry obtain; the
space differs from ordinary flat space only through its topology. That is why the metric
gOV V++++ contains two independent length scales: L, which fixes the overall curvature in
four dimensions, cannot control the sizes of the “spatial” sections (determined by K),
precisely because these sections have no curvature of their own. Since the length scale of
the torus is independent of L for this particular (exactly flat) spatial geometry, it must be
independent of L even if we begin to distort the torus away from exact flatness. (It should
be pointed out here that string theory is defined on higher-dimensional spacetimes, and
that the “hidden” dimensions are always taken to be compact, and often to be flat. Thus,
the compactness of the “visible” dimensions is particularly natural in string cosmology, a
fact strongly emphasised by Ooguri et al. [54].)
Now let us follow Ooguri et al. and take this metric as the Euclidean version of a
spacetime metric. That is, we truncate the space along the three-dimensional surface
t = 0, where time emerges; notice that this surface has the topology of a torus. The
spacetime on the other side has a metric which is obtained by complexifying both ρ and
L (so that e2 ρ/L remains real). This works only because K is an independent parameter;
if the “spatial” sections had themselves been curved, this curvature would have been
determined by L, with disastrous consequences when L is complexified. For these simple
yet deep reasons, we maintain [55] that the Ooguri-Vafa-Verlinde account of the “pre-
temporal” state requires time to emerge along a torus.
It is surely no coincidence that spaces of toral topology14 actually play a very basic
role in string theory. String theory has a very unusual symmetry, known as T-duality
[56]. In general terms, this symmetry implies that string theory defined on a torus is
insensitive to a replacement K → L2string/K, where K is the toral radius parameter we
have been discussing, and where Lstring is a fundamental parameter of string theory, the
string length scale. “Insensitive” here means that the result of this transformation is the
same physics described in a different way. This is often interpreted to mean that, in string
theory, it does not make sense for a torus to have a “radius” smaller than about one string
14There are actually a few other compact flat three-dimensional manifolds apart from the three-torus,
but all of them can be obtained from the torus by means of yet further topological identifications.
Henceforth, “torus” means any member of this finite and fully-understood family of spaces.
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length. (This slightly vague idea is made explicit in one particularly interesting approach
to string cosmology, the “string gas cosmology”; see [57].) This distinguished torus of
minimal size is the obvious candidate for the surface along which time emerged. (In fact,
earlier work on “creation from nothing” [49][50] always did assume that the Universe was
created along a minimal spacelike surface; here we are saying that this assumption is
particularly natural and meaningful in string theory defined on a torus.)
Notice that the existence of a minimal initial spacelike surface automatically solves
the problem of having an initial Big Bang-style singularity; that is, the theory implicitly
violates one or another assumption of the Singularity Theorems. In fact a toral cosmology
can only be non-singular by violating the Null Energy Condition; but we are already
committed to this in any case if we intend to make use of baby universes. (Exotic matter
which violates the Null Energy Condition will violate any of the conditions assumed by
the Singularity Theorems.) The original space considered by Ooguri et al. (with metric
given by equation (8)) does not contain any minimal surface; the exotic matter removes
the singularity and replaces it by a geometry which does have such a surface.
It is implicit in this argument that it is possible for the Universe to come into existence
with a size given approximately by the string scale. That seems very reasonable, but we
should point out that the string scale is normally thought to be substantially larger than
the Planck scale, the scale at which it is usually surmised that quantum gravity effects
come to dominate. This suggests that quantum gravity does not in itself fully explain
the Arrow. (It does play a role in the theory to be put forward later, but only through
small, perturbative effects.) Once again, the fact that the toral scale K is completely
independent of the spacetime curvature scale L is of basic importance here.
On the other hand, the string scale may be too short to be the scale at which Inflation
starts. Happily, in the cases of interest to us, the toral topology itself allows this problem
to be solved, in the following manner [15]. Essentially what happens is that the toral
topology initially prevents cosmological horizons from forming, so that the entire universe
can be seen by a single observer. (Recall that a cosmological horizon forms when objects
escape beyond the observer’s view; but it is difficult to escape from a torus, since the
escapee tends to find itself back where it started.) Cosmic baldness then applies to the
entire universe, so that, if we can achieve smoothness initially, this smoothness will be
maintained by that effect. Eventually, however, a cosmic horizon does form, and Inflation
in the conventional sense can begin; but, by that time, the universe has expanded to the
appropriate size, much larger than the string scale. Thus, toral topology can reconcile
the Inflation scale with the string scale. (See [58] for the use of tori to “delay” Inflation,
though the approach there is different.)
Throughout this discussion, we have been assuming, for simplicity, that the torus
is endowed with its exactly flat, and therefore perfectly locally isotropic, geometry. In
discussing the Arrow in this context, we cannot of course begin in this way. Fortunately,
everything we have said here can be formulated for a completely arbitrary geometry on the
initial torus, fixing only its topology. With such an arbitrary geometry, it no longer makes
sense to speak of the “radius” of the torus, but it still has a well-defined (finite) volume;
this fixes a definite length scale, which we continue to denote by K. The overall spacetime
in the immediate vicinity of the initial spacelike surface will also have a characteristic
length scale, independent of K, which again we continue to denote by L. The concept
25
of a minimal surface in a general Riemannian manifold is a classical one, defined as
follows [59]. Consider a family of finite (compact) subspaces embedded in a manifold.
The subspaces have metrics induced on them, and, as one moves from one subspace to
another, this metric will usually change, and so will the volume of the subspace. The rate
of change of the metric is measured by an object usually called (in physics) the extrinsic
curvature; it can be regarded as a tensor Kab defined in each subspace. A subspace is said
to be minimal if it minimizes the volume for variations with fixed boundaries, and this
requires the trace of this tensor to vanish: we have:
Kaa = 0, (9)
with an implied summation on a.
The concept of a minimal surface can be generalized to the situation we are considering
here, resulting in the same equation. We claim that time emerges along a spatial slice of
minimal volume, a claim which we can now formulate in terms of this equation. (In this
discussion we have used Riemannian geometry, meaning that we have been examining the
boundary surface “from the Euclidean side”, but the surface will also be minimal from
the spacetime side, in the obvious sense.)
On the Euclidean side, the geometry we are discussing can be described concretely as
follows. The vectors perpendicular to the boundary minimal surface allow us to define a
coordinate ρ such that the metric, at least locally, takes the form
g(F, ha b, K, L) = dρ
2 + K2 h(ρ/L, θc)a b dθa dθb , (10)
where the θ1,2,3 are the angular coordinates on the torus, and h(ρ/L, θc)a b is the metric
on the torus labelled by ρ; it is completely arbitrary, apart from the condition that its
dependence on ρ is subject to the demand that the boundary must be minimal. The
corresponding spacetime metric on the other side of the boundary is obtained simply by
complexifying ρ and L (but not K).
In this section, we have argued that the Arrow is related to the emergence of time
itself. The argument is simple: that which has no past cannot be distorted by any “prior”
conditions. Guided by the work of Ooguri et al. on the string-theoretic view of the “pre-
temporal” state, we have been led to a concrete picture of the earliest era of the universe.
It would certainly be of great interest to pursue the programme of Ooguri et al., in order
to further elucidate the nature of the Euclidean region. (Notice for example that the
complexification of L means that, if the spacetime is predominantly positively curved,
as it will be if it inflates, then the Euclidean region must be negatively curved; indeed,
Ooguri et al. use a space which is locally identical to hyperbolic space.) However, that is
not needed for our purposes.
We have seen that string theory may contain a ritual for exorcising the ghosts of the
past. The penalty we pay for this exorcism is however a heavy one: whatever the principle
responsible for Eve’s Arrow may be, it cannot, for obvious reasons, act causally. In the
next section we argue that general relativity contains certain features which, in a sense,
are acausal.
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4.2. The Initial Value Problem for Gravity
We have repeatedly referred to Newton’s epochal separation of dynamical laws from initial
conditions. For Newton this was a natural thing to do, because the initial positions and
momenta of a collection of classical particles can be prescribed completely arbitrarily.
Gravity, however, is different.
At first sight it seems paradoxical to speak of “time evolution” for gravity, since, if
one does not already know the spacetime structure, one does not know how time itself
behaves. This apparent paradox is resolved in the following extraordinary way. One
begins with a three-dimensional manifold Σ, on which is given a Riemannian (that is,
signature +,+,+) metric hab, a symmetric three-dimensional tensor Kab, a function ̺
and a three-dimensional vector field Ja, together with data for the “matter fields”. At
this point, Kab, ̺, and J
a “have no meaning”; one simply proceeds to solve the Einstein
field equations in a formal way, so that Σ is embedded in the resulting spacetime. One
then finds that these fields “turn out to have been”, respectively, the extrinsic curvature
of the “initial” surface Σ, the value of the energy density of the matter fields on Σ as
measured by observers whose worldlines are perpendicular to Σ, and the projection onto
Σ of the four-dimensional energy-momentum flux vector seen by these observers. Thus
these objects acquire their meanings retrospectively.
All of this is strange and suggestive enough. But what is still more interesting is
the following. Suppose that we try to prescribe the metric on Σ, the tensor Kab, and
so on, completely independently of each other. Then, generically, one will find that the
Einstein field equations simply do not have a solution. Solutions exist only if the initial
data are related to each other by means of a complicated set of equations, the initial value
constraints :
Da (Kab − Kcc hab) = − 8πJb
R(h) + (Kaa)
2 − KabKab = 16π̺. (11)
Here Da is the covariant derivative operator in Σ, there is an implied summation on the
indices when they are repeated, and R(h) is the scalar curvature defined by hab. (See [60],
Chapter 10. We can regard Da as an operator which measures spatial rates of change
within Σ; we shall discuss the meaning of R(h) in more detail later.) One must not think
of these relations as having anything to do with the fields interacting with each other;
they are strictly acausal; they are imposed on the initial data by the presumed existence
of the “subsequent” spacetime as a structure compatible with the Einstein field equations.
Now the following idea suggests itself. The function ̺ has (retrospectively) a direct
physical significance, and it is reasonable to suppose that some physical principle will
restrict it. Later, for example, we shall suggest that ̺ should never be negative along a
surface Σ where a universe is being created. The initial value constraints then impose
conditions on the geometry of Σ. One might even regard these conditions as laws of
nature of precisely the kind requested in Section 2.2. In fact, however, this point of view
has never been taken. Why?
The reason can be understood by considering a special case, the beginning of time as it
appears in the Hartle-Hawking theory [50]. Here time begins (or emerges) along a spatial
section with vanishing extrinsic curvature and with the topology of a three-dimensional
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sphere. The second equation in (11) is then simply
R(h) = 16π̺. (12)
Thus the scalar curvature and the initial energy density cannot be prescribed indepen-
dently. But does this really represent much of a restriction? Suppose for example that we
are given ̺ as an arbitrary non-negative function on the three-dimensional sphere. Can
we find a metric such that (12) is satisfied? The answer is that this is, indeed, always
possible: this is a consequence of a profound theorem due to Jerry Kazdan and Frank
Warner [61]; see [15] for a discussion of this theorem. If ̺ is an extremely complicated,
irregular function, then the geometry of Σ will likewise be extremely irregular. In short,
under normal circumstances, the geometry of the topological three-sphere is constrained
so weakly by the initial value constraints that the latter cannot be considered worthy of
the title of “laws of nature”.
So it is, at least, for universes created with spherical topology. One of our main claims
in this work is that it is otherwise with the torus. Before explaining this, let us be more
precise as to the physical conditions we are going to assume.
4.3. Creation vs Destruction
In order to explain the origin of the Arrow, we must of course make some physical assump-
tions. These should either follow from string theory, or at least be so plausible (or “mild”)
that one can hold out hope that they will follow from string theory (when, perhaps, the
emergence of time is better understood).
In general relativity, each observer defines at each point a four-dimensional energy-
momentum flux vector T µ. This specifies the flow of energy in various spatial directions,
as seen by this observer. Also, the observer’s worldline has a tangent vector V µ at each of
its points. In general these two vectors need not be parallel, but one can specify whether
they point in the same general direction in spacetime by computing the projection of T µ
onto V µ; this projection, if it is not zero, is either parallel to V µ or anti-parallel to it (that
is, it points in exactly the opposite direction.)
Now consider the spacelike hypersurface Σ constituting part of the boundary of space-
time, and let Nµ be the field of unit vectors, perpendicular to Σ at each point, and pointing
inwards from the boundary. (The inwards/outwards distinction can be given a rigorous
mathematical definition; see [15].) We can think of Nµ as defining tangent vectors to the
worldlines of a family of observers. Suppose now that we claim that this particular Σ
represents the creation of the Universe. Whatever this means precisely, we can formulate
it mathematically as follows. If T µ is the energy-momentum flux vector field associated
with Nµ, then T µ, evaluated on Σ, never points outwards ; that is, its projection on Nµ is
never anti-parallel to Nµ. On the other hand, if Σ is a boundary along which the Universe
is being destroyed, then we shall take this to mean that T µ, again evaluated on Σ, does
point outwards. The intuitive picture here — not to be taken too literally — is that while
the spacelike components of T µ measure flows of energy within Σ, its timelike component
tells us whether energy is “coming into the world” (in a direction perpendicular to Σ) or
taking leave of it.
These statements are the only input we shall need regarding the energy content of
the universe. In order to prove them, one would need to have a detailed physical theory
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of “creation” and “destruction”, which in turn would demand an understanding of the
“emergence of time” far beyond what we can claim to have. At this point they are
just simple postulates about the correct mathematical representation of “creation” and
“destruction”. They are motivated by the Landscape, in the following sense.
Recall that, in the Landscape, the nucleation of a Coleman-De Luccia baby universe
has the effect of lowering the value of the vacuum energy. Certain unfortunate babies will
“overshoot” the desired value of the cosmological constant, so that they have a negative
vacuum energy. These will expand at first, but eventually they will begin to contract;
classically, they will terminate in a singularity. (A vacuum which contains nothing but
negative vacuum energy is never singular; this is the famous “anti-de Sitter space” beloved
of string theorists. If, however, such a spacetime also contains a small amount of “normal”
matter, then the collapse will not be so innocuous.) We shall assume that, instead of a
singularity, a string-theoretic treatment will lead to a minimal spacelike surface, along
which time “submerges”, that is, it ceases to be meaningful. Now despite their name,
the “initial” value constraints apply in this case; substituting the minimality condition
(equation (9)) into the second member of (11), we obtain
16π̺ = R(h) − KabKab. (13)
Now recall from section 3.3 that the spatial sections of a Coleman-De Luccia baby universe
are, if perturbations are ignored, negatively curved. Therefore, we see from this equation
that ̺ has to be negative in this case, since the term involving the extrinsic curvature can
be expressed, at each point, as a sum of squares. But ̺ is just the time-component of T µ
as seen by observers with inward-pointing tangent vectors (see [60], Chapter 9); its being
negative implies that T µ points outward. Hence we see that, according to our postulates,
spacetime is indeed being destroyed in this case; which is as it should be.
This discussion is for motivation: it does not prove anything. For, as always, we
must not assume that the spatial sections of this universe will retain the geometry of
an exact space of constant negative curvature. If they did so, then in fact R(h) would
become more negative as this universe shrinks. If they fail to do so, then the behaviour
of R(h) is less clear; on the other hand, the term involving the extrinsic curvature would
then grow, so in either case we can expect ̺ to remain negative. Also, independently
of this equation, one can argue on general grounds that there must be a strong negative
contribution to ̺ (in addition to the background vacuum energy, which of course is also
negative) from whatever it is that prevents a singularity here. Thus, it does seem that,
in the Landscape, the destruction of universes is associated with negative (total) energy
densities. Our postulate, based on this evidence, is that this is true in general. Conversely,
it is natural to suppose that the total energy density is never negative when a universe is
created. (Note that the vacuum energy in the creation case is not negative, and that the
topology and geometry of the spatial surfaces are also different in that case.)
We stress the obvious: the conditions we are proposing here are almost ridiculously
weak, especially when they are compared with the extremely strong restrictions on the
geometry of Σ which we hope to extract from them. All they require is that the vector T µ
should point in a certain general direction; this is no more specific than saying that (either)
Cambridge is “northward” of Singapore. Furthermore, they require this only on Σ, not
in the bulk of the spacetime itself. This “weakness” is very important, because it means
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that our arguments are correspondingly robust. If we had demanded physical conditions
involving equations, then we would have to fear that corrections to those equations might
ruin the argument. But all we are requesting here is that the time component of T µ
should satisfy a certain inequality along Σ. Obviously, inequalities are robust: if a certain
number is positive, for example, then so are all nearby numbers. We will shortly see how
this works in detail.
4.4. And Then A Miracle Happens: The Arrow Explained
Now let us put all of the pieces together. We assume that the Eve universe was created
along a minimal-volume spacelike surface Σ with the topology of a three-dimensional
torus but with otherwise unknown geometry (except that the overall length scale is given
by K ≈ Lstring). Why should we believe that the geometry of this torus is not generic,
that is, extremely irregular?
First, note that we agreed that “being created” means that T µ, the energy-momentum
flux vector field defined by the inwards-pointing normal field Nµ, should never point
outwards. But, because ̺ is the time-component of T µ as seen by these observers, this
simply means that, along Σ only, we have
̺ ≥ 0. (14)
Inserting this and the minimality condition Kaa = 0 into the second member of the initial
value constraint equations (11), we get
R(h) = KabK
ab + 16π̺ ≥ 0; (15)
recall that the term involving the extrinsic curvature is essentially a sum of squares.
As expected, our weak physical assumptions have led to an apparently feeble constraint
on the metric on Σ. First, as we have stressed, we have a mere inequality. Second,
let us recall the definition of the scalar curvature. At each point, a three- (or higher-)
dimensional manifold can curve in many ways, depending on the direction in which the
space is sliced. Thus, even at a fixed point, such a space can be negatively curved in one
direction, and positively curved in another. The scalar curvature at a point is simply a
constant multiple of the average of all of these various curvatures. Now to say that the
average of a collection of numbers is not negative is to say almost nothing: for example,
all of them but one could be negative, as long as the one exception is sufficiently large that
it outweighs all of the others combined when the total is taken. Thus, we have no right
to expect anything interesting from a condition like (15); and, as we mentioned earlier, in
the case of spherical topology one can actually prove that this condition hardly constrains
the geometry at all.
But now something extraordinary arises. One has the following theorem, obtained by
combining several extremely deep geometric results of Richard Schoen, Shing-Tung Yau,
Mikhail Gromov, Blaine Lawson, and Jean-Pierre Bourguignon. (For technical details,
and full references, see [62] and [15].)
THEOREM (Schoen-Yau-Gromov-Lawson-Bourguignon): Consider the set of all possible
Riemannian metrics on any torus. In this set, the only metrics with everywhere non-
negative scalar curvature are those which are perfectly flat; that is, their full curvature
tensor vanishes exactly.
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The proof of this theorem — let us call it the SYGLB theorem for brevity — is very
abstruse; appropriately, perhaps, it makes use of techniques originally drawn from physics
(particularly the concepts of Dirac operators and spin geometry).
The SYGLB theorem is a genuinely astonishing result. First, the theorem surveys
all possible geometries on the torus. Second, and even more startling, it means that the
average of the curvatures can only be non-negative if each and every curvature vanishes
exactly — the curvatures cannot “average out” to a non-negative value. Third, the result
must somehow link the curvature tensor to the specific topology of the torus, since no
such result holds in the case of spherical topology.
Suddenly we find ourselves in a different world from the case of the sphere. For now
the inequality (15) implies the following equations.
First, and of course most importantly, (15) now implies that the full curvature tensor
of the “initial” three-dimensional surface Σ is exactly equal to zero. The Eve universe
had to be created along a spacelike surface which was perfectly flat, which means that it
was exactly locally isotropic around each point.
This is of course a major step forward, but we are not yet done. Essentially, we have
fixed the initial spatial metric, but we have not yet fixed its “time derivative”, as we must
do if we wish to have a complete set of initial conditions. Furthermore, while it may be
“natural” to assume that the initial state of the inflaton shares the symmetries of the
initial spatial section, ideally we should prove this. In principle, the geometry might be
perfectly regular while the inflaton field is highly irregular.
Again we refer to (15): having deduced that the curvature is zero, the left side must
vanish, and so therefore must the right. But since the right side is a sum of terms
which cannot be negative, the only way they can add to zero is if all of the terms vanish
separately. Thus we find that
Ka b = 0; (16)
that is, the entire extrinsic curvature matrix vanishes initially. This is of course a far
stronger condition than the mere vanishing of its trace. The initial “time derivative” of
the spatial metric is now fixed: it has to vanish. This implies that the initial moment was
a moment of time symmetry ([60], Chapter 10). Classically, this forces the time derivative
of the inflaton field to vanish initially, an important contribution to putting the inflaton
into its minimal-entropy state. Of course, the geometry on the other side of Σ is not really
the same as that on the spacetime side; but classical local fields would not “know” this.
Quantum effects spilling over from the Euclidean domain may not be totally negligible,
however, so perhaps it would be more prudent to say that this argument shows that the
initial time derivative of the inflaton must be very small. This is acceptable, because the
inflaton need not be exactly constant for the approximate relation (4) to hold. (In fact
we want the inflaton to start (slowly) “rolling”.)
Next, we consider the first equation in (11). Now that we know that the extrinsic
curvature vanishes everywhere on Σ, so do its derivatives, so this equation simply requires
that
Ja = 0. (17)
Recall that Ja is the projection into Σ of the energy-momentum flux vector. This implies
that energy cannot flow in any direction at any point of Σ, which just means that the
inflaton field is uniformly distributed over Σ: it does share the uniformity of the underlying
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space, and so the spatial derivatives of the inflaton field vanish, and the inflaton is indeed
initially in its low-entropy, potential-dominated state.
Finally, we now see from (15) that the total energy density must vanish exactly ev-
erywhere on the initial surface. This is a reminder that some kind of exotic effect, which
violates the Null Energy Condition, must act initially in order to invalidate the Singu-
larity Theorems; it must contribute a negative energy density which exactly cancels the
energy of the inflaton initially (but not thereafter). A discussion of the nature of this
effect would take us too far afield here, but we may mention that the Casimir effect arises
naturally in spaces with toral topology; see [63] for a general discussion of Casimir effects
in cosmology, and [64][65] for recent discussions from a string-theoretic point of view. The
negative energy density need not be precisely a Casimir energy, but it must be something
similar: like Casimir energy, it must dilute very rapidly as the Universe expands, so that,
after a short period of expansion, its effect on inflationary physics is negligible. (Lest
the reader suspect a circular argument here, note that the initial vanishing of the total
energy density by no means implies the initial vanishing of the total pressure. Under
reasonable physical conditions, the “primordial pressure” will in fact be negative, and
this will launch the newborn Eve into an immediate phase of accelerated expansion, even
though the inflaton energy density has been (momentarily) canceled. For speculations on
the possible identity of the “Casimir-like” effect, see [15].)
We can now claim to have fixed the initial conditions of the Eve universe, in a manner
which is so restrictive that, as requested in section 2.2, it deserves the name of a “law
of nature”. For now the initial metric has been fixed (up to relatively inconsequential
issues such as the precise global shape of the initial flat torus), and so has its initial
“time derivative” (equation (16)). The (classical version of the) law simply states that
the Eve universe was born along a surface which was perfectly flat and embedded in such
a way that its extrinsic curvature was exactly zero. The law has been derived from the
string-motivated demands that the topology of this surface should be toral (from the
construction of Ooguri et al. [54]), that it should be minimal (from T-duality), and that
the energy-momentum flux vector on it should never point outwards from spacetime.
This is the origin of the Arrow of Time: the initial geometry has to be smooth, the
inflaton has to begin in the potential-dominated state. The Eve universe (eventually)
inflates, and gives birth to baby universes which inherit her Arrow. The rest is history.
We conclude this section by asking: is there anything analogous to the SYGLB theorem
for other compact three-dimensional manifolds? This problem can be solved with the aid
of various theorems due to Gromov, Lawson, Grigori Perelman, and John Milnor; see [15]
for the details. The answer is “no”: all non-toral compact three-dimensional manifolds
are unsatisfactory either because they are like the sphere (that is, they support arbitrarily
irregular metrics with non-negative scalar curvature) or because, no matter how they are
deformed, they have no metric of non-negative scalar curvature (so that they do not
permit a universe to be created along them in the first place). Thus, according to the
ideas advanced here, we can say that the construction of Ooguri et al. [54] leads precisely
to the only universes which can have an Arrow.
This, too, is a very remarkable conclusion. For we should not imagine that a torus
with a generic geometry will “look very different” from any other space endowed with its
generic geometry. (Think of an extremely distorted two-dimensional torus: the “handle”
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distinguishing it from a sphere could be very small and inconspicuous, and the fact that
it has exactly one handle will be far from obvious.) Thus we see that the Arrow is an
intrinsically global phenomenon. That is, in order to determine whether an Arrow will
arise in a given set of circumstances, it is not enough to know what is happening in the
immediate vicinity of an observer; one has to examine the entire spatial section.
Now in this connection it is important to understand that, while Eve is spatially
finite, her babies are not. This strange fact can be roughly explained as follows. We
said that a Coleman-De Luccia baby universe expands outward into the mother universe
at a rate approaching the speed of light. This means that, in the manner familiar from
special relativity theory, there is an increasing disparity between lengths in the spatial
sections inside the baby and those of the outside universe. Eventually this effect becomes
so extreme that it becomes possible to fit an infinite space inside the mother spacetime
— the point being that, as usual in relativity, mother and child have different ways of
slicing spacetime into spatial sections. In fact, ignoring perturbations, one finds that the
babies have spatial sections which are copies of an infinite space with constant negative
curvature; it is well known that this shape can fit inside the forward light cone of any
point in Minkowski spacetime, and it fits inside the baby universe in much the same way.
(We discussed the consequences of this shape for the baby’s spatial slices in sections 3.3
and 4.3.) Even if we do not ignore perturbations, this will only change the geometry, not
the topology, of the spatial sections of a baby.
The global structure of the babies is therefore quite different to that of Eve. The
topology of the spatial sections near their birth (and thereafter) is that of ordinary infinite
space, which is certainly not constrained by any result analogous to the SYGLB theorem.
Hence, our argument showing that Eve has an Arrow will not work for the babies. This
agrees with our thermodynamic argument to the effect that the babies can only have an
Arrow if they can inherit one, ultimately from Eve.
The fact that the Arrow is a global phenomenon also solves one of the most puzzling
questions about time: why should the destruction of spacetime not be associated with
“special”, low-entropy conditions?
4.5. Against “Final” Conditions
We agreed in section 2.4 that a successful theory of the Arrow must explain not just how
it arose at the creation, but also what happens to it over the full span of history. Let us
see how this works in the theory we have developed here.
A spacetime (like Eve) with a positive vacuum energy cannot be destroyed after it is
created, because it never stops expanding. Eventually, however, Eve will have descendants
which do destroy themselves. This happens, as we discussed in section 4.3, when a universe
in the Landscape “overshoots” as the value of its vacuum energy decreases, so that the
value becomes negative. What happens to the Arrow, assuming that this universe has
inherited one, near the “destruction end” of such a universe?
The answer is simple: a universe of this kind will have spatial sections which, like those
of any other baby universe, do not have toral topology. Thus we cannot apply the SYGLB
theorem to the spacelike slice along which this universe ceases to exist. We therefore have
no reason to expect that the geometry of this slice will be in any way “special”.
The only reason we believe in the existence of “special conditions” at the creation of
33
our Universe is that Nature gives us no option: the tendency of entropy to increase is
a fundamental fact, confirmed “experimentally” at each moment by all of us. By sharp
contrast, there is no evidence whatever for special conditions at any time in our future.
Since we now have a theory in which an asymmetry between creation and destruction
is natural and inevitable, the parsimonious course is to assume that there are no special
conditions at any time in our future. The fate of the Universe, from start to finish, is
determined by special initial conditions alone. In the case of universes in the Landscape
which overshoot into negative vacuum energy, we can expect that, as they contract, their
anisotropies will grow rapidly, and that their final spatial geometry will be extremely
distorted, in agreement with the second law of thermodynamics. In short: the global
nature of the Arrow ensures that it points in the same direction throughout the Landscape,
even in universes which destroy themselves.
The only other regions where spacetime is “destroyed” is inside black holes [11]. The
local circumstances around black hole singularities ([60], Chapter 12) are indeed somewhat
like those near to the singularity in a collapsing universe. The resemblance does not stop
there, however: the topology of the “final” spatial section inside a black hole is also non-
toral, even if the black hole arises from the collapse of a star in a toral cosmology. As
before, it can be shown that there is no analogue of the SYGLB theorem for this topology;
so there is no reason to think that the Arrow behaves in any unusual way inside black
holes15. Again, the global nature of the Arrow is crucial here.
It is clear from this discussion that the only way “special conditions” could ever arise
in connection with destruction is if a toral universe is destroyed. We stress that, in our
picture of the Arrow, Eve is the only toral universe, and Eve is never destroyed. In that
sense, “destruction along a torus” is not an issue. Nevertheless, the logic of our model
demands that it should never, even hypothetically, be possible to enforce low-entropy
conditions at a surface where a universe is being destroyed; otherwise an observer might
find “the destruction of the universe” to be in his past. That would suggest that the
theory is internally inconsistent.
The proof that this cannot happen is instructive. Let us suppose that we have a toral
universe which is contracting towards what would be, classically, a final singularity. Now
in discussing this situation, we are eager to avoid the charge of cosmic hypocrisy, so let
us treat it, as far as possible, in exactly the same way as we treated the creation of a
universe. We shall assume, then, that when this universe contracts to about the string
length scale, the “Casimir-like” negative energy becomes important, violating the Null
Energy Condition, and invalidating the Singularity Theorems. (Unlike negative vacuum
energy, the “Casimir-like” field has negative pressure, and so its gravitational field is
repulsive; thus it has the power to stop the contraction.) This is how ̺ can be negative,
in accordance with our mathematical formulation of “destruction”.
But with negative ̺ inserted into the second member of (11), we find that our earlier
argument simply cannot get started: R(h) is equal to an expression which is a sum of a
non-negative term with one which is negative. Such a sum could be of either sign, so we
cannot apply the SYGLB theorem here, except to put bounds on the squared extrinsic
curvature (which cannot, for example, at every point exceed the local value of 16π |̺|).
15This comment applies to universes like our own, with positive vacuum energy. The situation in the
negative vacuum energy case is more complex and remains to be fully understood.
34
Thus we can put very mild constraints on the rate at which the universe rushes to its
doom, but we cannot constrain its geometry when it arrives there.
To see this in detail, let us assume for simplicity that the extrinsic curvature of the
“final” boundary does vanish. Then the second member of (11) requires the scalar curva-
ture to be negative everywhere. We know that demanding non-negative scalar curvature
imposes strong conditions on the boundary geometry. What are the consequences of hav-
ing scalar curvature which is negative? Is there a symmetry, in the space of all metrics on
the torus, between metrics with scalar curvatures of opposite signs? Here we can use the
following theorem, which is an immediate consequence of the Kazdan-Warner theorem
mentioned earlier [61]:
THEOREM: Let M be any compact manifold of dimension at least 3, and let f be any
scalar function on M such that f is negative somewhere on M . Then there exists a
Riemannian metric on M having f as its scalar curvature.
We see that negative scalar curvature is radically different to the positive case. Non-
negative scalar curvature imposes extremely strong conditions; negative scalar curvature
imposes none at all. Fix any negative function on the torus, no matter how convoluted,
and there will be some (equally convoluted) geometry such that the scalar curvature is
equal to the given function. Thus there is no reason whatever to expect the “destruction”
surface to have a “special” geometry or for any physical field to be in a “special” state.
Entropy will always be high when a universe is destroyed, even in the case of toral topology.
Hence our theory is internally consistent.
What, then, is the ultimate origin of the strange asymmetry between the the size of
the entropy at the creation and destruction of a universe, even when the topology is toral?
The answer is found partly in the detailed structure of the general-relativistic initial value
constraints, but mainly in the extreme asymmetry of the space of all metrics on the three-
dimensional torus. In this vast space, the set of metrics with non-negative scalar curvature
is absurdly small compared to the set of metrics with negative scalar curvature: this is the
content of the SYGLB theorem and of the Kazdan-Warner theorem. This geometrically
special condition is turned into the physically special state of the early universe by the
gravitational initial value constraints and by the way they control the initial state of the
inflaton.
5. Conclusion: The Ageing Of The Multiverse
For each one of us, the passing of time is a basic aspect of experience: the transience of
life is intimately related to its meaning. In the theory presented here, this phenomenon is
a relic of conditions which were established even before our Universe was born, a souvenir
of the emergence of time itself.
What we have found here may be described as the final triumph of the second law
of thermodynamics. The latter is now seen to rule not just our Universe, but the entire
Landscape; in particular, the birth of new universes occurs in a manner that is strictly in
accord with the second law; our Universe has low entropy now because it was preceded by
a universe which had still lower entropy, and so on back to Eve. In short, the multiverse
ages.
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What remains is to develop a quantitative theory of this ageing process. This will
involve (at least) three major steps.
First, we need a precise analysis of the quantum-mechanical process which breaks the
perfect symmetry of the spatial sections of the Eve universe. Unfortunately, this process
is not yet fully understood at a fundamental level: the perturbations seem to occur on
length scales even shorter than the Planck scale. (See [12] and [57] for discussions of
this “transplanckian modes” problem.) More generally, one will want to have a better
understanding of the “emergence” of time in terms of the quantum-mechanical version of
the main initial-value constraint, namely the Wheeler-De Witt equation, possibly along
the lines suggested in [66]. Perhaps a deeper understanding of the theory of Ooguri et al.
[54] will help here.
Secondly, we need a much better understanding of the way the geometric entropy
grows during the process of the birth of a baby universe, and of the way this fits together
with ideas about how baby universes inflate [67].
Finally, we need a clearer picture of the rate at which baby universes nucleate, so that
we can predict the conditions in the Eve universe at the time when this happens. Note
that transitions from larger values of the vacuum energy to smaller values can involve
quite large steps, so the number of steps from Eve to our Universe need not be large;
this important fact [3] needs to be taken into account. In addition, recent developments
[68][69][70] have suggested that there may exist one or more mechanisms which can greatly
shorten the time needed for transitions to occur. Thus it may be possible for babies to
be born when Eve is still extremely young. Clearly, much remains to be done.
The long-range hope is that one will eventually be able to compute, using greatly
refined theories of Inflation and the Landscape, a precise theoretical value for Penrose’s
number P . That would be clear evidence that we have finally understood the Arrow in
all of its aspects.
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